In this paper, we examine the empirical determinants of politicians' pay. Contrary to widespread assumptions, we document substantial variation in the wages of politicians, both across states and over time. Using data for the US during 1950-90, we provide what we believe to be the first empirical analysis of gubernatorial pay. We find that gubernatorial wages respond to changes in state income per capita and taxes, even after controlling for state and time fixed effects. The economic effects seem large: governors receive a 4.5 percent increase in pay for each ten percent increase in income per capita in their states and a 1 percent pay cut for each ten percent increase in per capita tax payments. We then test "payfor-performance" versus "rent-extraction" models of pay determination. The evidence suggests that the income elasticity is driven by rentextraction considerations, while the tax elasticity is governed by a (primitive) pay-for-performance model. Lastly, we document several patterns that suggest that "democracy" plays a role in shaping gubernatorial pay.
I. Introduction
An important question in economics and politics concerns the motivation of politicians.
A traditional starting point is that politicians, in contrast to private sector managers, are socially motivated. That is, politicians are altruistic and do not care about monetary income. In this naïve view, one can ignore politician pay, as it is irrelevant: as long as it allows politicians to subsist at a reasonable level, pay should not affect their actions. This perspective, however, does not sit well with our intuitions as researchers, or as human beings. In response, over the last 50 years or so, economists and political scientists have considered more realistic formal models of political economy. In them, politicians no longer set out to maximize social welfare but instead seek to increase their chance of reelection, try to expand the sizes of the organizations they manage, and even accept bribes.
However, once politicians have some pecuniary motivation, it would seem that a natural starting point in trying to understand their conduct is to study politician pay. The primary purpose of this paper is to take a first step in analyzing the officially sanctioned financial compensation of politicians.
Economists often assume that non-private sector workers face flat pay schedules and low powered incentive schemes. A case in point is bureaucratic compensation. 1 Two explanations have been proposed, one based on the implication of multiple objectives of government bureaucracies and the other based on the idea that only informal incentives, i.e., career concerns, matter (see, for example, Tirole (1994) ). Although we know of no fully-fledged model of politician pay, a reasonable first approach to these issues suggests that, similar to the theories of pay in bureaucracies, monetary payments would play a minor role and that we should expect to see little variation in the remuneration of politicians. 2 Yet, in any particular year, there are large cross-state differences in the pay of political leaders in the United States. For example, in 1996, the most recent year for which we have data, the governor of the state of New York earned $130,000, while the governor of Montana earned about $55,000, and cross-sectional dispersion only increases as we look back in time. Furthermore, there are also large differences in gubernatorial pay, in real terms, over time. Average pay for governors (in 1982 dollars) went from $48,090 in 1950 $48,090 in up to $80,037 in 1968 $48,090 in . By 1994 it was down to $58,738. Thus, contrary to popular belief, there is considerable variation in political compensation, both over time and across states. One of the contributions of the paper is simply to document the basic patterns that are present in the data.
We go on to analyze the relationship between the governor's wage and state performance, using data for 48 states over the period . Reports in the media suggest that politicians' pay is not, by any means, mechanically determined; rather, it is heavily influenced by economic conditions. For example, in the late 1980s, with the American economy in a recession, newspaper accounts described considerable opposition to politicians' attempts to increase their own wages. Thus, when Texas lawmakers announced their intentions to vote a wage increase in 1989, the Houston Chronicle responded with an editorial arguing that, " [w] hen the state's economy is still struggling and thousands of Texans are unemployed, lawmakers shouldn't expect much public sympathy over how little they are paid". 3 We examine this possibility empirically, following the approach developed in the executive compensation literature and applying it to politician pay. We find that, after controlling for state and year fixed effects, there is a strong and robust positive association between gubernatorial pay and state per capita income. The elasticity is unexpectedly large, in excess of 0.4. Two alternative theories can explain the relationship between wages and income.
In a principal agent model, the public implicitly provides incentives for politicians so that they put forward effort in the design and implementation of good policies. Since good policies are assumed to increase income, the public rewards the governor with higher wages when they experience higher income. This can be called "pay for performance".
An alternative theory maintains that politicians are rent-seekers. They take as much in wage as they can, constrained by the public's patience and the cultural stigma attached to greedy public servants. This may be called "rent-extraction". The two theories can be distinguished by examining the impact of forces that are beyond the governor's discretion that affect state income. Optimal incentive schemes should not incorporate such measures into compensation: they increase noise (for which the agent must be compensated) and do 3 Similar events took place in California during this period. not improve effort. The most obvious example is aggregate income. If governors receive higher wages as a result of increases in income that originate in the aggregate economy, then we can reject pay for performance in gubernatorial pay. The evidence is one sided: most of the income sensitivity of gubernatorial pay seems to fall in the category of rentextraction.
Inspired by theories describing voters as fiscal conservatives, we include the state's level of taxes as a second measure of performance (see Peltzman (1992) We find a strong and robust negative effect of taxes on the pay of state political leaders. Governors suffer a one percent pay cut for each ten percent increase in taxes per capita, or equivalently, a one standard deviation increase in per capita tax payments brings about a decline of ten percent of a standard deviation in gubernatorial pay. Thus, governors get a similar pay increase if they raise income per capita of their voters by 1 percent or if they reduce per capita tax payments by 4 percent. Again, our pay for performance interpretation can be challenged using a simple model of rent extraction. Now, however, we find evidence that forces beyond the governor's control that affect the revenue-raising requirements of the sate government have no effect on gubernatorial pay. Furthermore, the strong correlation between taxes and gubernatorial wages derives primarily from wage increases of governors that have been in office for more than a year. Collectively, this evidence suggests that voters (and legislatures) may, in fact, be rewarding governors for fiscal discipline (or, symmetrically, punishing governors for fiscal irresponsibility). Thus, in addition to rent extraction, at least some form of pay for performance is influencing gubernatorial wages.
In a firm, managers' wages are set, at least in theory, by the shareholders of the firm. Analogously, voters may be seen as ultimately setting the wages of politicians, and may have some scope to do so through various political institutions. Unfortunately, economists have paid little heed to such issues. As Wittman (1989) warned, economists give too small a role to democratic institutions in the formulation of policy. In his view, economists routinely construct models where a perfectly competitive market for goods exists beside a very imperfect market for votes. He goes on to assert that this asymmetry exaggerates the information and coordination problems (amongst others) present in "electoral markets" that, when properly functioning, tend to yield "policy-efficient" outcomes. Accordingly, we investigate if "democracy" plays a role in controlling the rent-extraction activities of politicians. Since our sample consists of the US over the last 40 years, heterogeneity of democratic practices is a relative term. First, similar to Besley and Case (1995), we exploit variations in gubernatorial term limits and reelection opportunities to provide some evidence on the role of accountability. Second, we look at the way in which opposition in the state senate affects the determination of gubernatorial pay. Our results provide some evidence that "democracy" plays a role in the determination of politicians' pay.
To our knowledge, there is no previous published work on the empirical determinants of a politician's legal monetary income. There is however, some work looking at a related margin: the impact of economic variables on the election probabilities of incumbent political leaders. An important literature has looked at the impact of economic events on political popularity, both based on actual votes and on popularity functions (see Fair (1978) , Frey (1978a) , Alesina and Roubini (1997) , inter alia). In Frey (1978b) it is explicitly argued that politicians may "consume" the pursuit of partisan objectives when they have a comfortable lead in popularity, i.e. when there are electoral rents. Closer to our paper is Besley and Case (1996) , which examines the effect of state economic performance (relative to neighboring states) on the re-election probabilities of US governors. They find evidence in favor of the hypothesis that voters take into account By far the most common element to newspaper reports complaining about governors' wage increases is that such increases are inappropriate at times when the state is struggling with a fiscal crisis.
information from neighboring states in what can be called a nexus of yardstick competition. In a related contribution, Wolfers (2000) looks at the electoral performance of governors and finds that they are rewarded for luck, in the sense that exogenous positive shocks to state income increase the likelihood of re-election. More generally, we share with Besley and Case (1996) and Wolfers (2000) an interest in studying data in political markets using the techniques and ideas of the recent executive compensation literature.
Section II describes the paper's empirical strategy, while section III describes the data and its sources. Section IV presents our empirical results and section V concludes.
II. Empirical Strategy
Our empirical strategy proceeds in three stages. First we estimate the performance elasticity of governor's pay. We then evaluate whether this evidence favors principal agent models, where there is incentive-based pay, or rent-extraction models. Lastly, we check if democracy limits the amount of rent-extraction.
The basic regression takes the form:
where Wage it is the log of the governor's wage in year t and state i, Perform it is a measure of performance such as the Log of Income per capita or the Log of Tax Payments per Capita, Controls it is a set of controls that include the governor's age and the state's total population, η is a state fixed effect, λ is a year fixed effect and ε is an i.i.d. error term.
The hypothesis that politicians are paid like bureaucrats (i.e., compensation is not tied to performance) is equivalent to testing for α≠0. This coefficient can then be compared with those obtained in similar regressions in the literature on executive compensation, as well as comparable regressions that use bureaucratic wages as the dependent variable.
Second, conditional on finding α≠0, we investigate if this is evidence of pay for performance or of rent extraction by politicians. A first, simple test is provided by examining regressions of the determinants of the state Health Commissioners' pay. The strategy is to examine the pay of the member of the executive branch whose effort is least likely to affect performance. Accordingly, a principal agent model predicts that his/her pay should not be based on state income per capita.
Our second approach is to investigate whether the governor's pay is correlated with the component of state per capita income that is beyond the control of the governor.
The canonical principal agent model predicts that the presence of noise reduces the power of incentive schemes (see, for example, Holmstrom (1979) ). Recent empirical work in executive compensation has focused on this feature of the principal agent model (see, for example, Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) and Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000) ; see Wolfers (2000) for an application of the same techniques to gubernatorial elections).
Since we are interested in a similar set of questions related to politician pay, we closely follow their approach. It consists of re-estimating regression (1) with two-stage-leastsquares techniques using the log of average personal income for the state's neighbors
(Log of Neighbors Income). Since Log of Neighbors Income is observable, and
presumably reflects a regional shock that cannot be attributed to the governor's performance, it should not affect pay, under a pay-for-performance model. Including it would increase the risk faced by the politician (and hence average pay) and would not improve his/her incentives to provide effort. In other words, the hypothesis is that, once instrumented, the state's income should not affect politician pay. 5 An exactly analogous approach may be followed in looking at shifts in tax rates that are beyond the control of the governor: we use tax payments of adjacent states (Log of Neighbors Taxes) as a summary statistic for regional shocks to demographics, economic circumstances, and region-specific policies that would impact the revenueraising requirements of a state. As in the instrumental variables regressions for income, if governor compensation is governed by pay for performance, once instrumented, tax levels should have no impact on pay.
In the final section of the paper we test whether democracy broadly conceived, limits the rent-extraction activities of politicians. The tests we explore are of two basic types. First, we study the disciplining role of elections. Similar to Besley and Case (1995) , we check for different behavioral responses of our basic model when the governors can seek re-election and choose to do so, versus situations when they are unable or uninterested in running. In particular, governors facing reelection may be less inclined to seek wage increases, lest it become an election issue.
Second, we check if the income sensitivity of gubernatorial pay is lower when the opposition party controls the state senate. The idea is that the public makes pay decisions through its elected officials, and that opposition parties will be more effective in their control functions than same-party officials. Since the state senate is the final arbiter on matters of gubernatorial pay decisions, we focus on the role of this section of the legislature. Our reasoning here is precisely analogous to the idea of the co-opting of a board of directors by a CEO: if the board is filled with allies, there will be fewer constraints on the CEO's ability to set his own wage.
III. Basic Description of the Data and our Sources
Our basic outcome variable, the level of pay of state governors, is taken from the Book of the States, a publication of the Council of State Governments. Since this is only a biannual publication, our regressions are limited to observations from even years. 6 This publication has comprehensive coverage of the wages of senior elected officials and bureaucrats from each state, and was also the source of our wage data for the Health Commissioner for each state. To put these data into real terms, we deflated using the Bureau of Labor Statistics' consumer price index for urban consumers (1982 = 100). We also collected data on the average wage of a bureaucrat in each state, taken from the Statistical Abstract of the U.S.
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Our primary 'performance' measure is the log of state personal income per capita (again, in 1982 dollars) , taken also from the Statistical Abstract of the U.S. Our second measure of performance is taxation, which we measure using the log of total state taxes Results available upon request. We thank Justin Wolfers for kindly providing us with the oil price and industry share data. 6 We have tried to find annual observations by contacting states directly, but have not yet been able to obtain these data.
per capita (income + sales + corporate). 8 Since these data are all available annually, we are able to use tax and income data from odd years, between the two pay observations, which should better reflect pay reactions to 'performance', rather than contemporaneous relationships.
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A number of covariates will also be important in the specifications below. In particular, a common finding from the CEO pay literature is that compensation is highly correlated with organizational size, presumably because of the greater skills required to manage a larger and more complex firm. A parallel argument also applies in the case of governors: the casual cross-sectional correlation between state population and governor's wage is, not surprisingly, very high (equal to 0.63 for 1990). Since population also tends to be correlated with income and wealth, it will be important to include state population as a control.
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Life-cycle considerations might also be important for the governor in seeking pay increases; hence, we also collected data on governors' ages, taken from the Book of the States. To further probe the issue of whether compensation comes from rentseeking or pay for performance, we also define a variable, In Power ≥ 2, that takes on a value of one in year y if the governor had been in office in year y-2, i.e., the previous observation in our biannual data set.
Our section on the role of democracy in controlling the rent-seeking of politicians will require additional data on the political situation in each state. To examine the alignment of the governor with other politicians in the state, we define Opposition as a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the governor's political party holds less than a majority (i.e., 50 percent) of seats in the state Senate.
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A related hypothesis looks at the disciplining effect of re-election; for this, we define the variable Upcoming Election, which takes on a value of one if there is an election before the next observation at t=y+2 in which the current governor was able to run, and chose to do so. So, following Besley and Case (1995) , we coded upcoming elections where the governor chose not to run, or was a lame duck, as zero.
In order to maintain a consistent sample over time, and to be consistent with previous work, we limit our coverage to the 48 states that were already in existence in 1950 (i.e., we exclude Alaska and Hawaii). In order to utilize the tax data of Besley and Case (1996) , our series ends in 1990. Since, as mentioned above, we only have biannual observations for our wage data, we are limited to looking at even years.
Before proceeding to our regressions, it will be instructive to examine the basic patterns present in our data, since so little quantitative work has looked at politician pay. However, note that these results reflect only medians; as we will see below, there turn out to be important differences between the compensation of governors and other public officials. Furthermore, changes in wages are not so highly correlated: the correlation between changes in gubernatorial wages and changes in the wages of Health Commissioners is only about 0.15. Similarly, detrended wage data are only weakly correlated. It is also worth noting that there is much greater smoothness in the wages of average bureaucrats over time. This is not surprising, since it reflects a pooling of all individuals in state governments, and also might reflect less stickiness in wages.
It is also interesting to observe that there are periods over which governors' wages decline in real terms. There are, however, almost no nominal declines in wages (only 6 of any magnitude in our data, one of which is accounted for by the Massachusetts governor donating a third of his wage to charity); hence, almost all wage declines come from periods where wages remained constant or increased at a rate lower than inflation. This is illustrated in Figure 1B In Figure 2A , which shows the average percent change in governors' wages over the preceding two years, it is apparent that wages in the latter part of the period under study increased, for the most part, every four years, thereby yielding the sawtooth pattern illustrated in this figure. The peaks in the figure coincide with years in which there had been recent gubernatorial elections in most states. Thus, when the sample is split into governors approaching the ends of their terms, versus governors that were recently elected to office, the sawtooth pattern disappears (see Figures 2B and 2C) . Moreover, when we look at the difference between these two groups, we find that wage increases are uniformly much higher for governors not facing imminent elections. While these results are highly suggestive of certain political economy explanations, we will defer further interpretations to the results section below, where we may examine these patterns while appropriately controlling for other factors. Finally, we list the summary statistics for our data in Appendix B.
IV. Empirical Results

IV.a. Basic Estimates of the Performance-Elasticity of Pay
In this section we estimate the basic relationship between gubernatorial pay and two measures of performance. The first is the (log of) personal income per capita. Regression (1) in Table 2A , shows the simplest specification. The coefficient on income per capita is positive and comfortably significant. A one-percent increase in income per capita is associated with a 4.5 percent increase in the governor's wage. This is a large elasticity: to a first approximation it is as large as the estimates obtained CEO compensation literature (see, for example Murphy (1999) ), in looking at the sensitivity of pay to share price.
Regression (2) includes the log of the governor's age and the log of population to control for the possibility that the governor's wage is adjusted for seniority and to control for the size of the state. This latter effect is analogous to the positive correlation between revenues and CEO compensation that is reported among both for profit and non-profit organizations. Table 2A uses the Log of Taxes per Capita in the state as a measure of performance. The coefficient is negative and well defined. It shows that if the state's tax payments per capita increase by ten percent, the governor's wage falls by one percent. Note that, while we might be concerned that per capita tax payments would be highly correlated with business cycles and state income, the coefficient on tax payments is unchanged by the inclusion/exclusion of income per capita (see regression (5)). Hence, it appears that taxes exercise an effect on wages that is independent of income.
Regression (3) in
14 As a benchmark, Table 2B estimates similar regressions for average bureaucratic wages in the state. Regression (6) shows that the basic income elasticity of pay is about 0.28, or a little more than half the gubernatorial pay elasticity.
15 Regression (7) shows that this holds after including the log of state population to control for size effects. More interesting are regressions (8) and (9) which show that the coefficient on state taxes is positive and significant. Hence, in contrast to the results reported in the gubernatorial regressions, an increase in state taxes is related to higher average bureaucratic wages.
This suggests that pay to top political officials is governed by a different set of dynamics than average bureaucratic wages.
14 As stressed by Wooldridge (2000) , autocorrelation of errors can have different implications for the suitability of fixed-affects in levels approaches, as described above, versus first differencing. He suggests that, unless one has strong priors regarding the choice of model, that both be utilized, to insure robustness. We report the log specification with fixed effects in order to be consistent with previous work on CEO compensation. When we repeat our analyses using first differences, we obtain very similar results. These are available from the authors upon request. Table 3A presents the results of regressions where the dependent variable is the (log of) the wage received by the Health Commissioner in the state. Regression (10) shows that there is also a large income elasticity of pay for these officials. Since the Health Commissioner is possibly one of the members of the executive branch that is least likely to receive incentive pay based on state income, this result is in itself is suggestive of extraction motives. It could still be argued that politicians are part of teams and that the Health Commissioner is rewarded on state income, as is the rest of the team. Regression (11) shows that the Health Commissioner's wage is insensitive to the proportion of the state's population that is over 65 years of age, a variable that should be correlated with his workload. Note that the Health Commissioner's wage is uncorrelated with per capita taxes, once again highlighting taxation as a potential means of evaluating and awarding governors for fiscal discipline (regressions (12) and (13)), and making the "team" interpretation suggested above less plausible. however, is positive and not statistically significant.
IV.b. Testing Pay-for-Performance versus Rent-Extraction Models
We repeat the same exercise to explore further the structure of the tax elasticity of pay. Again the hypothesis is that there exist observable factors that are not influenced by any of the governor's actions that affect the state's tax rate. An example could be an unexpected weather disruption in the region, such as a storm or a natural disaster. The first stage regression, listed below, shows that there appear to be region-specific shocks to taxation, as a state's level of taxation is highly correlated with that of its neighbors where Log Neighbors Taxes per Capita denotes the log of the average taxes per capita in the geographical neighbors, and the regression includes both year and sate fixed effects.
In contrast to the results on per capita income, once instrumented, we do not find any effect of taxation on the governor's income, as illustrated by the results in regression (16). Thus, the data suggest that governors may in fact be rewarded for fiscal responsibility rather than 'lucky' tax reductions. As in the instrumented income regression above, it may be argued that neighbors' taxes are a useful benchmark for voters in judging the performance of their elected officials, and should therefore be included directly in the performance equation. We examine this possibility in regression (17), and do not find any evidence that this is the case.
IV.c. Further Tests and the Role of Democracy
In an attempt to further examine the role of performance in governors' pay, we make the observation that an important tenet of pay for performance is that agents are rewarded for performance that is correlated with the actions they take, not the actions taken by their predecessors. So, if the income sensitivity of pay reflects pay for performance we expect the point estimate of Log of income per capita to be bigger for governors who have been in power for more than one year.
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Thus we create a variable that takes the value 1 if the governor has been in power for at least 2 (In Power ≥2). The same is true for the tax elasticity of pay. If governors were punished for delivering tax increases, we would expect to see bigger effects for governors with longer tenure, as, presumably, they are responsible for those increases. In this context, identifying rent-extraction motives versus pay for performance is feasible. While a positive interaction effect (Performance * In Power≥2) is consistent with both extraction and pay for performance when performance is measured using income per capita, a negative coefficient when taxes are used is evidence of pay for performance. This is so because a governor could use his experience in office to entrench himself. With taxes as a measure of performance, a negative interaction shows that voters punish (reward) governors more who are more likely to have been responsible for such increases (reductions). An entrenched governor would be able to avoid pay cuts in such circumstances. Regressions (18), (19) in Table 4A show that tenure has little effect on the income elasticity of pay, but that it has a significant negative effect on the tax elasticity of pay. The coefficient on taxes increases by almost 100 percent when we are dealing with governors that have been in power for at least two years. Again, this is consistent with voters using pay for performance when performance is defined as tax payments.
To the extent that the democratic process controls rent-seeking by governors, we might expect term limits and imminent elections to play an important role in constraining wage increases. This is strongly suggested by the patterns illustrated in Figure 2 ; we examine this issue more carefully in Table 4B . The level effect of facing re-election is significant and negative, i.e., governors are less inclined to push for wage increases immediately prior to an election. However, somewhat surprisingly, we do not observe any significant coefficients on the interaction of Upcoming Election with our measures of performance: that is, we do not observe re-election possibilities intensifying the effect of taxation, as pay for performance, or attenuating the rent-extracting effects from economic growth.
We also look at the effect of political opposition on the sensitivity of pay for performance. Our reasoning here is precisely analogous to the idea of the co-opting of a board of directors by a CEO: if the board is filled with allies, there will be fewer constraints on the CEO's ability to set his own wage. Regressions (22), (23) of Table 4B evaluate the hypothesis that governors who face significant political opposition will have their pay respond more to performance. Here, we do find significant effects that may be interpreted as increased monitoring. The first of these regressions show that the income elasticity of gubernatorial pay falls by about 0.14, or approximately 25 percent, when the governor's party does not have a majority in the State Senate (Opposition).
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The second regression looks at the effect of the opposition on the sensitivity of pay to taxation. We find that the tax elasticity of the governor's wage is more than doubled when the governor's party does not control the Senate.
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Thus, we find the results on tax-setting to be consistent with the idea that controlled and monitored governors must perform well (i.e., lower taxes) in order to increase their own wages. In contrast, the relationship between state income and gubernatorial compensation seems governed by rent extraction, which is attenuated by the existence of a solid opposition. Hence, political/democratic institutions may indeed serve an important role in imposing discipline on gubernatorial wage-setting.
V. Conclusion
An important tenet of modern political economy is that politicians are self-interested.
Rather than maximize social welfare, it is claimed, they seek power, ego-rents and even bribes. Once this is recognized, a natural question arises concerning the possibility that pay may be used to motivate politicians through standard (monetary) incentive contracts.
Thus, the purpose of this paper is to study politician pay through the lens of the recent literature on executive compensation. We focus on the pay received by state governors in the United States, between 1950 and 1990.
Since, to our knowledge, there is no previous published work on the topic, our first task in the paper document the basic patterns in the data. This provides us with a useful starting point. We find that governors' wage data exhibits a substantial amount of variation, both across time and across states. It seems that the view that politicians are paid like bureaucrats can be rejected, if by the latter we mean that bureaucratic pay does not exhibit much variation.
We then investigate whether these variations can be matched with state performance indicators in ways that would be predicted by a simple principal agent contract designed to motivate governors. We find that gubernatorial wages respond to changes in the level of income per capita in the state and also to levels of tax payments per capita, even after controlling for state and time fixed effects. The income elasticity of pay is large, both in comparison to the basic elasticity of pay of bureaucratic wages in the state (about twice as large) and compared to the basic estimates in the CEO pay literature.
The economic effects seem large: governors receive a 4.5 percent increase in pay for each ten percent increase in income per capita in their states and a 1 percent pay cut for each ten percent increase in per capita tax payments. The tax elasticity of pay is consistent with a view of voters as fiscal conservatives (Peltzman (1992) ).
We then test if these elasticities reflect "pay-for-performance" motivations or if the governor is extracting rents from the public. In order to do this we exploit the fact that including observable noise into a contract reduces the payoff to the principal (as it introduces risk for which the agent must be compensated) and does not improve the governor's incentives. The evidence suggests that the income elasticity is driven by rentextraction considerations, while the tax elasticity is governed by a (primitive) pay-forperformance model.
Lastly, we find some evidence suggesting that "democracy" plays a role in shaping gubernatorial pay. We find that having the state senate dominated by the opposition party doubles the tax elasticity of gubernatorial pay. 
